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Abstract
This paper argues against the view that trolley cases are of little or no relevance 
to the ethics of automated vehicles. Four arguments for this view are outlined and 
rejected: the Not Going to Happen Argument, the Moral Difference Argument, the 
Impossible Deliberation Argument and the Wrong Question Argument. In making 
clear where these arguments go wrong, a positive account is developed of how trol-
ley cases can inform the ethics of automated vehicles.
Keywords Automated vehicles · Ethics of risk · Trolley problems · Ethics of harm
Introduction
Automated vehicles (AVs) are expected to encounter road-traffic scenarios which 
present moral dilemmas.1 There is a dispute about what kind of moral dilemmas 
AVs will encounter. What some people have in mind are dilemmas where harming 
at least one person is unavoidable; and a choice is required about how to distribute 
harms or risks of harms between multiple persons whose interests are in conflict 
(Goodall 2014; Gurney 2016; Lin 2016; Leben 2017; Keeling 2018a, b). What oth-
ers have in mind are dilemmas that arise in normal driving. For example, a scenario 
in which the AV must decide how heavily to brake when approaching a crossing 
given uncertainty about whether a pedestrian will step into the road (Nyholm and 
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Smids 2016; Himmelreich 2018; Thornton 2018). On either view, there is a substan-
tive moral question about which values ought to be reflected in the AV’s decision-
making algorithm. Call this the moral design problem.2
One approach to the moral design problem involves asking what morality requires 
in trolley cases. In these cases: (1) the AV must choose one of two actions; (2) the 
AV knows what the consequences of each action will be; (3) each action imposes 
a distribution of benefits and burdens over at least two affected parties; and (4) the 
interests of these parties are jointly unsatisfiable. Jean-François Bonnefon and col-
leagues discuss one example in which the AV can continue its present course and 
cause the deaths of five pedestrians; or swerve to avoid the pedestrians but cause its 
passenger’s death in the process (Bonnefon et al. 2016).
The relevance of trolley cases to the moral design problem has been challenged in 
recent papers (Goodall 2016; Nyholm and Smids 2016; Himmelreich 2018). There 
are four serious charges: (1) trolley cases are not going to happen in the real-world; 
(2) there is a substantive moral difference between trolley cases and real-world colli-
sions, e.g. real-world collisions involve decision-making under risk and uncertainty 
and trolley cases do not; (3) it is impossible for AVs to deliberate in accordance with 
answers to the moral design problem based on trolley cases, as these cases presup-
pose a ‘top-down’ approach to AV engineering; and (4) trolley cases provide a moral 
answer to what is ultimately a political problem, in the sense that the values encoded 
into AV decision-making algorithms ought to reflect a compromise between the val-
ues of the relevant stakeholders. This paper defends trolley cases against these four 
charges, and in doing so, develops a positive account of how trolley cases might 
inform the ethics of AVs.
The Not Going to Happen Argument
According to what might be called the Not Going to Happen Argument,
P1  Trolley cases are relevant to what morality requires in dilemmas where harm-
ing at least one person is unavoidable, and a choice is required about how to 
distribute harms between multiple persons whose interests are in conflict.
P2  AVs will not encounter dilemmas like these.
2 Two points on the moral design problem. First, earlier formulations of the moral design problem con-
cern only road-traffic scenarios where harm to at least one person is unavoidable; and a choice is required 
about how to distribute harms or risks of harm between multiple persons whose interests are in conflict 
(Keeling 2018a: 414, b: 259). The formulation in this paper is broader insofar as it also concerns the val-
ues relevant to determining AV behaviour in mundane traffic situations (c.f. Himmelreich 2018). Second, 
the moral design problem is not the only ethical question relevant to AVs. There are several other issues, 
such as identifying and minimising the risks associated with the transition to AVs; and how responsi-
bility is distributed for harm or property damage caused by AVs. These issues require at least as much 
attention as the moral design problem. But the existence of these other issues does not entail or suggest 
that the moral design problem is unimportant. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me 
on this point.
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C  Therefore, trolley cases are irrelevant to the moral design problem.
This argument is unsound. The standard response holds that P2 is false, i.e. that 
there are plausible examples of trolley cases which AVs might encounter in the 
real-world (Goodall 2014: 60–61; Lin 2016: 71–72; Santoni de Sio 2017: 416–417; 
Keeling 2018a: 425). In one of these examples, the AV is travelling on a two-lane 
bridge. A bus in the other lane swerves into the AV’s lane. The AV can either brake, 
in which case it will collide with the bus; or it can swerve into the other lane, in 
which case it will hit the side of the bridge (c.f. Goodall 2014: 60). Cases like these 
seem plausible. But in recent work the philosopher Johannes Himmelreich (2018: 
673–674) has argued that AVs could not be in trolley-style scenarios whilst at the 
same time maintaining sufficient control to make a decision. Roughly speaking, 
Himmelreich’s point is that a trolley-style dilemma is unlikely to arise if the AV is 
travelling sufficiently slowly to make a meaningful decision; and that in the sorts of 
high-speed cases where a trolley-style dilemma might arise, it is unlikely that the 
AV would have sufficient control to make a decide how to allocate benefits and bur-
dens between the affected parties. So, grant P2 for the sake of argument. It is argued 
that the Not Going to Happen Argument is unsound conditional on the assumption 
that AVs will not encounter trolley cases in practice.
First, the Not Going to Happen Argument is deductively invalid, in the sense that 
it is possible for P1 and P2 to be true and for C to be false. To guarantee the truth of 
C, a third premise is required:
P3  Cases of type X are relevant to the moral design problem only if AVs will 
encounter cases of type X in the real-world.
This premise is false. The mistake is most obvious when the Not Going to Happen 
Argument is applied to a law in physics. Consider the Ideal Gas Law,
This law describes the relation between certain properties of gasses. It holds that 
the product of the pressure and volume of a gas is equal to the amount of gas in 
moles multiplied by the gas constant multiplied by the absolute temperature. This 
law applies to ideal gasses. An ideal gas consists of many randomly moving parti-
cles with no spatial extension engaging in perfectly elastic collisions. There are no 
ideal gasses. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the Ideal Gas Law is irrel-
evant to the behaviour of real-world gasses. This is because in a broad class of cases 
the Ideal Gas Law accurately describes how changes in some of the properties of a 
gas make a difference to other properties of the gas.
The same point can apply to trolley cases. These cases presuppose a model of 
morality according to which some acts are morally permissible, others are morally 
required, and others are morally impermissible.3 Some examples: (1) it is morally 
PV = nRT
3 The terms ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’ could be used instead. But ‘morally right’ is ambigu-
ous between morally permissible and morally required. So, these terms are used to avoid ambiguity. The 
properties relate as follows: an act is morally required just in case it is not permissible to not perform that 
act; and an act is morally impermissible if, and only if, that act is not morally permissible.
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permissible to help old people across the street; (2) it is morally required to save 
someone from severe harm if doing so imposes only a small personal cost; and (3) 
it is morally impermissible to torture babies. First, ‘morally permissible’, ‘morally 
required’ and ‘morally impermissible’ are properties of acts, in the sense that it is 
true or false of a given act that it is morally permissible, morally required or morally 
impermissible. Second, the moral permissibility of an act depends on certain other 
properties of that act. These are called morally relevant properties. Presumably, 
what makes it the case that torturing babies is morally impermissible is that this act 
has the property of causing gratuitous harm. So, causing gratuitous harm is mor-
ally relevant. Third, the point of asking what morality requires in trolley cases is to 
determine under idealised conditions how some properties of acts make a difference 
to the moral permissibility of those acts (Kagan 1988: 5–8, 2016: 151–154; Kamm 
2016: 13). The not unreasonable hope is that the relations between the properties of 
acts and their moral permissibility in ideal cases is relevant to the moral permissibil-
ity of acts which instantiate those same properties in more noisy real-world cases.4
This is all quite abstract. Keeping in mind the model of morality described 
above, here are two practical examples of how trolley cases might be used to decide 
between competing answers to the moral design problem. First, in a recent paper, 
Julian de Freitas, Sam E. Anthony and George A. Alvarez write that:
The main safety goal for any driver – human or machine – is to avoid harm 
[…] Unfortunately, both humans and today’s best computer systems are imper-
fect at it. Even so, the substantial improvements that we rightfully expect from 
future AV systems are utterly unlikely to come from considering trolley dilem-
mas. (de Freitas et al. 2019: 4)
It is true that trolley cases will not help to build AV systems that are better at avoid-
ing harm than existing AV systems. But this is like criticising a hammer for being 
a bad screwdriver. Trolley cases are not a computer programming tool, so it is rea-
sonably obvious that trolley cases will have no useful application in this domain. 
However, trolley cases are relevant to the claim that avoiding harm ought to be the 
main safety goal for AVs. This claim, interpreted in the terminology of the model 
sketched above, holds that the only property which makes a difference to the moral 
permissibility of the AV’s acts is the property of causing harm. Trolley cases pro-
vide good reason to believe that this claim is false. Consider the philosopher Foot’s 
(2002) original
Trolley Driver: A trolley’s brakes fail. The driver can continue on the same 
track and kill five workmen; or steer the trolley onto another track, saving the 
five workmen but killing one workman on the other track.
4 The philosopher Frances Kamm writes: ‘we can see why the cases that have been the focus of atten-
tion in trolley problem discussions seem artificial and unrealistic. They are specifically constructed, like 
scientific experiments, to distinguish among and test theories and principles […] because one theory or 
principle would imply the permissibility of conduct that the other theory or principle would deny. Using 
our intuitive judgements about which implications for cases are correct helps us decide among, and also 
revise, theories and principles’ (Kamm 2016: 13).
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And
Transplant: A surgeon can kill one patient and use their organs to save the 
lives of five other patients.
If Freitas, Anthony and Alvarez are correct that harm is all that matters, then the 
trolley driver is morally required to kill one person to save five; and the surgeon is 
morally required to kill one patient and harvest their organs to save five others. In 
both cases, these actions would cause the least harm. But whilst most people have 
the intuition that it is permissible to redirect the trolley in Trolley Driver, most peo-
ple also have the intuition that it is morally impermissible to kill one to save five in 
Transplant. It would be a serious moral error if the surgeon killed one patient with 
the express intention of harvesting their organs to save five others. Presumably, what 
explains the difference in intuitions here is that the cases differ in some morally sig-
nificant respect. In other words, there is a property other than harm contributing to 
the moral permissibility of the actions. But if this is true, then Freitas, Anthony and 
Alvarez are incorrect that harm is the only property of actions which makes a differ-
ence to moral permissibility. So, one application of trolley cases to the moral design 
problem is that trolley cases can be used to argue against theories of which proper-
ties make a difference to moral permissibility.
It might be objected that Trolley Driver and Transplant are too divorced from the 
context of AV collisions for the relations between the properties of these acts and 
moral permissibility to be relevant to the moral design problem. But it is possible 
to make trolley cases which are closer to the context of AV collisions. For example, 
suppose that a motorcyclist is skidding across the road towards a crowd of pedes-
trians on the pavement. The AV can brake, in which case the motorcyclist will skid 
into the pedestrians and cause their deaths. The AV could also accelerate into the 
motorcyclist, in which case the motorcyclist would be killed, but the skid would be 
deflected and the pedestrians would be unharmed. Presumably, it is morally permis-
sible for the AV to brake here. It is too demanding to suppose that the AV is morally 
required to intervene and kill the motorcyclist. But if Freitas, Anthony and Alvarez 
are correct that harm is all that matters, then the AV is morally required to kill the 
motorcyclist. The salient point here is that properties other than harm seem to make 
a difference to the moral permissibility of the AV’s acts in ideal cases. It seems that 
whether or not the harm is done or merely allowed to happen is morally relevant. 
Presumably, the properties of doing harm and allowing harm to happen are instan-
tiated by some acts available to AVs in the real-world. So, absent good reason to 
believe that the relation between these properties and moral permissibility is radi-
cally different in real-world cases, the view that avoiding harm is all that matters in 
AV collisions ought to be discarded.
This first illustration of the relevance of trolley cases to the moral design problem 
was negative: trolley cases can be used to show that theories of what matters mor-
ally in AV collisions are false. In making precise which properties of acts make a 
difference to moral permissibility in cases like Trolley Driver and Transplant, it is 
also possible to formulate positive arguments about which properties AVs should 
take into account when making decisions. Here is an example: Foot’s explanation 
of the conflicting intuitions in Trolley Driver and Transplant appeals to positive and 
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negative duties. Foot argues that Trolley Driver involves a conflict between two neg-
ative duties: the duty not to kill one and the duty not to kill five. The duty not to kill 
five is stronger than the duty not to kill one, so it is morally permissible to kill one to 
save five others. In contrast, the conflict in Transplant is between the negative duty 
not to kill one and the positive duty to aid five others. It is better, on Foot’s view, to 
let five people die than it is to kill one person (Kamm 2016: 15–16; Thomson 2008: 
360, 2016: 114). So, Foot’s explanation of why it is permissible to kill one to save 
five in Trolley Driver but not in Transplant is that Trolley Driver is a choice between 
killing one and killing many, whereas Transplant is a choice between killing one and 
letting many die. Suppose Foot is correct that this distinction is the best explanation 
of the conflict in intuitions. Then there is good reason to ensure that AVs are sensi-
tive to the moral difference between killing and letting die.
To conclude: The Not Going to Happen Argument holds that trolley cases are 
irrelevant to the moral design problem because AVs will not encounter trolley cases 
in the real-world. This argument falsely assumes that trolley cases are relevant to 
the moral design problem only if AVs will encounter these cases in practice. What 
matters for the relevance of these cases to practical ethical dilemmas is that the acts 
in practical dilemmas instantiate some of the morally relevant properties which trol-
ley cases are concerned with. It is not unreasonable to suppose, for example, that 
whether an AV kills someone or merely allows them to die makes a difference to the 
moral permissibility of the AV’s actions. So, trolley cases are relevant to the moral 
design problem even if AVs will never encounter trolley cases in practice.
The Moral Difference Argument
According to the Moral Difference Argument, trolley cases and real-world collisions 
are different in at least some morally significant respects; and these differences ren-
der trolley cases of little or no relevance to the moral design problem.
The simplest version of this argument holds that trolley cases ignore at least some 
properties of the AV’s acts which make a difference to the moral permissibility of 
those acts in real-world collisions (c.f. Nyholm and Smids 2016). Two examples: 
(1) Trolley cases exclude information about which of the affected parties is respon-
sible for the collision. In real-world collisions, facts about who is responsible in part 
explain the moral permissibility of the AV’s acts. (2) Trolley cases omit information 
about special obligations. In real-world collisions, it might be that the AV manufac-
turer has an obligation to protect the welfare of the AV’s passengers and that this 
contributes to the moral permissibility of the AV’s acts.
The insight here is that trolley cases cannot provide the entire answer to the moral 
design problem. This is unsurprising. It is almost never true that a set of imagined 
cases provides sufficient reason to accept a view about morality. But this does noth-
ing to diminish the relevance of trolley cases to the moral design problem. First, 
suppose that trolley cases are used to argue that a property such as letting people 
die in part contributes to the moral permissibility of the AV’s acts. The fact that 
there exist other morally relevant properties in real-world collisions does not render 
the property letting people die less relevant than it otherwise would be. It is either 
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morally relevant or it is not. Second, suppose that a trolley case is used as a counter-
example to an account of the morally relevant properties in collisions. If the account 
holds that one property, e.g. harm, is morally relevant, then the existence of other 
morally relevant properties cannot be invoked to diminish the relevance of the trol-
ley case. The existence of other morally relevant properties implies the falsity of the 
account being defended. If the account holds that multiple properties matter morally, 
then for analogous reasons additional morally relevant properties cannot be invoked 
to diminish the relevance of a trolley case employed as a counterexample to that 
account. These are the only two obvious uses for trolley cases in the dispute over the 
moral design problem. So, it does not matter for the relevance of trolley cases that 
there exist other morally relevant properties.
A better version of the Moral Difference Argument holds that the moral consider-
ations in trolley cases are categorically different to the moral considerations in real-
world collisions. So, trolley cases are of little or no relevance to the moral design 
problem. The first step in this argument is to establish a non-normative difference 
between trolley cases and real-world collisions. Standardly, it is argued that in trol-
ley cases the AV knows the outcome of the collision conditional on each action. But 
in real-world collisions one action might produce several different outcomes, and 
the AV at best has a probability distribution over these outcomes. In short, AV col-
lisions involve risk (Himmelreich 2018: 676–677; Nyholm and Smids 2016: 1286). 
The second step holds that the non-normative difference between these cases gives 
rise to a normative difference. The claim here is that the presence of risk in colli-
sions renders the moral dilemmas in these cases different in kind to those in trolley 
cases. The philosophers Sven Nyholm and Jilles Smids write that:
Reasoning about risks and uncertainty is categorically different from rea-
soning about known facts and certain outcomes. The key concepts used dif-
fer drastically in what inferences they warrant. And what we pick out using 
these concepts are things within different metaphysical categories, with differ-
ent modal status (e.g. risks of harm, on one side, versus actual harms, on the 
other). (Nyholm and Smids 2016: 1286)
Once the distinction between risky and non-risky cases is made precise, it is clear 
that the categorical difference described here is insufficient to render trolley cases of 
little or no relevance to the moral design problem.
Take the orthodox model of decision-making under risk (Luce and Raiffa 1957; 
Savage 1972). In this model a risky decision involves a set of mutually-exclusive and 
exhaustive possible worlds, 휔1,… ,휔n ∈ ; and the AV is uncertain about which of 
these worlds is the actual world. In a simple case, the AV might be uncertain about 
whether or not a pedestrian will step out into the road. This scenario can be mod-
elled with two worlds: one in which the pedestrian steps out into the road, and the 
other where the pedestrian does not.
The AV must choose one action from a set  containing at least two alternatives. 
These might be swerving or continuing its present course. The outcome of the deci-
sion is determined by both the AV’s action and which world is the actual world, i.e. 
the outcome of the same action is different in different worlds. Formally, let 휒 be the 
set of outcomes. Each x ∈ 휒 might roughly be understood as the consequences of 
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performing an action in a particular world. But more precisely, these outcomes are 
to be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as to include facts about certain 
kinds of actions having been performed (Broome 1991: 4–5; Scheffler 1982: 1–2). 
Each action a ∈  is a function, a∶ → 휒 , that maps each world 휔
i
 to the outcome 
x
i
 of performing a in 휔
i
 . Thus, in this model, if two acts have the same outcomes 
across all possible worlds, these acts are equivalent.
The AV has a utility function, u∶휒 → ℝ , which assigns to each outcome x ∈ 휒 a 
cardinal representation of the moral value of that outcome. Given the broad defini-
tion of outcome, the utility function can incorporate deontic considerations such as 
the moral value of an outcome where the pedestrian is killed rather than allowed to 
die. The AV also has a credence function, cr∶ → [0, 1] , which takes as inputs sets 
of worlds in a finite algebra  over  , and outputs the AV’s degree of belief or cre-
dence in the proposition that each set of worlds contains the actual world.5 The acts 
in  are then evaluated from this position of uncertainty using a decision-rule. The 
best-known decision-rule is expected utility maximisation, according to which the 
AV should select the action which maximises the weighted sum of utilities over the 
different possible worlds, where the weights are determined by the AV’s credence 
in each world being the actual world. In formal terms, the AV should select the act 
which satisfies:
The difference that Nyholm and Smids identified between risky and non-risky 
cases can now be stated precisely. In non-risky cases, the AV knows which world 
휔
i
∈ is the actual world. So, each act can be evaluated using the outcome that 
it maps to in the actual world. In risky cases, it is necessary to consider different 
possible worlds when evaluating acts, as the moral value of an act depends on the 
value of the outcomes in different possible worlds. This difference is insufficient to 
render trolley cases irrelevant to the moral design problem. This is because trolley 
cases are relevant only to the AV’s utility function, in the sense that these cases are 
used to identify which properties are relevant to the evaluation of actions (e.g. harm, 
responsibility, fairness, and so on). Though risky cases present an additional prob-
lem of how to reason about utilities across worlds, the question of which properties 
the AV’s utility function should track is the same in risky and non-risky cases. In 
a sentence: there is no point talking about expected utility if the question of what 
utility is has not been settled (Crisp 2006: 39–40). So, the categorical moral differ-
ence between trolley cases and real-world collisions is not sufficient to render trolley 
cases of little or no relevance to the moral design problem.
argmax
a∈
n∑
i=1
cr
(
휔
i
)
u
(
x
i
)
5 First, Sven Nyholm has said in personal correspondence that he thinks of these cases as involving 
objective probability and not subjective probability. The response to the Moral Difference Argument 
applies irrespective of whether objective or subjective probabilities are used. Second, the finite algebra 
 over  . as the following properties: (1)  ∈  (2) X ∈  implies that its complement ( − X) ∈  
(3) if X1,X2 ∈  , then X1 ∪ X2 ∈  . Third, the AV’s credence function is assumed to be a probability 
function.
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The Impossible Deliberation Argument
According to the Impossible Deliberation Argument, AVs cannot deliberate in 
accordance with answers to the moral design problem based on trolley cases. This 
is because answers based on trolley cases presuppose a ‘top-down’ approach to AV 
decision-making (Gurney 2016: 208; Himmelreich 2018: 675; Nyholm 2018: 5). 
What it means for an AV to be programmed in a top-down fashion is that the AV 
follows a set of rules in collisions, where these rules are expressible in the language 
of first-order logic (Alaieri and Vellino 2016: 161–162; Allen et al. 2005: 149–151). 
The top-down approach contrasts with a ‘bottom-up’ approach, on which the AV’s 
actions are determined by a connectionist algorithm with no explicit rules. The prob-
lem is that AV decision-making algorithms standardly use a bottom-up approach, so 
it is unclear how answers to the moral design problem based on trolley cases will be 
implemented into AVs. Himmelreich writes that:
[trolley] cases naturally lend themselves to a top-down design approach. But 
given the current prominence of the bottom-up approach in artificial intel-
ligence in the form of neural networks, there is a risk of a discontinuity of 
approaches between ethics and engineering. (Himmelreich 2018: 675)
This argument is problematic for those who use trolley cases as inputs to so-
called collision optimisation algorithms. These algorithms are sets of instructions 
for how AVs should behave in trolley-style collisions. More precisely, they are func-
tions which take trolley cases as inputs and return a set of acts which the AV is mor-
ally permitted to perform in each case. Collision optimisation algorithms have been 
developed which reflect different answers to the moral design problem. The philoso-
pher Leben (2017), for example, defends an algorithm on which the AV should com-
pare the survival probabilities of the affected parties conditional on each act, and 
select the act which has the greatest minimum survival probability.
It is more or less clear that AVs cannot deliberate in accordance with algorithms 
like these. On one hand, these algorithms make implausible assumptions about 
the AV’s knowledge. There is no obvious reason to assume that the AV is certain 
about how many affected parties are in the collision; so, there is no obvious reason 
to assume that the AV will be certain about the survival probabilities of each party 
(Keeling et al. forthcoming). On the other hand, these algorithms require a top-down 
approach to AV decision making. Presumably, Himmelreich (2018: 675) is correct 
about the top-down approach being discontinuous with engineering practice. So, 
when trolley cases are used in this way, the Impossible Deliberation Argument pre-
sents a decisive objection.
But this is not the only way to use trolley cases. There is a distinction in utilitarian 
ethics between decision-procedures and criteria for rightness. A decision-procedure 
is a method of deliberation. A criterion of rightness is what explains the moral per-
missibility of actions (Brink 1986: 421; see also Bales 1971; Crisp 1992). A utilitar-
ian might believe that what ultimately explains the moral permissibility of actions 
are facts about the degree to which those actions promote or maximise utility. But 
that does not commit them to the further view that people are morally required to 
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deliberate in accordance with a utilitarian calculus. It might be better from the point 
of view of utility if people deliberated in accordance with certain moral virtues such 
as gratitude and beneficence (Hooker 2000; Crisp 1992).
There is a rough but important sense in which those designing collision opti-
misation algorithms are committed to the view that a good answer to the moral 
design problem is a decision-procedure for AVs, i.e. a set of instructions for how 
AVs should deliberate in the event of a collision. A more plausible view is that a 
good answer to the moral design problem is an account of the right-making prop-
erties of the AV’s actions in collisions. In other words, the answer explains what 
matters from the moral point of view, which might be utility, fairness, justice, 
rights, responsibility, justifiability to the affected parties, or some combination 
of these. The aim of such an account is to inform a process of value-sensitive 
design; that is, a process in which engineers, moral philosophers and other stake-
holders work together to determine the ethical implications of technical decisions 
made in the design-process (Thornton 2018; van de Poel 2013). There is no need 
for philosophers to design collision optimisation algorithms in order to explain 
the considerations relevant to determining right-action in collisions. Presumably, 
if the right-making properties of the AV’s acts in collisions are made precise, 
these properties can inform a process of value-sensitive design.
This is all quite abstract. So, consider an example. The philosopher Kamm (2016: 
62–67) argues that the Principle of Permissible Harm best captures our intuitions 
about what morality requires across a broad class of idealised cases. The philoso-
pher Shelly Kagan describes the basic idea of this principle as follows:
Sometimes someone who is killed is killed by an event that is the very same 
event as saving a larger number of people (the greater good). Then the kill-
ing of one may be justified. But in other cases, the one who is killed is killed 
by something that is merely a casual means to the event that is the saving of 
the larger number. In such cases killing the one is not justified. So the crucial 
question is whether the event that results in the killing of the one literally con-
stitutes the saving or is merely a means to that saving. (Kagan 2016: 156)
Here are two paradigmatic cases to illustrate the distinction that Kamm draws 
in the Principle of Permissible Harm. Consider,
The Fat Man on Bridge Case: George is standing on a bridge next to a fat 
man who is leaning over the barrier looking at the tracks below. An out of 
control trolley is heading towards five people. George can let the five people 
die, or he can push the fat man off the bridge, stopping the trolley but killing 
him in the process (Thomson 1976: 207–208).
If George pushes the fat man, then the fat man’s death would be a mere causal 
means to saving the five people on the track. The fat man being killed is what 
causes the five others to be saved. The Principle of Permissible Harm rules out 
pushing the fat man as it prohibits killing one merely as a causal means to sav-
ing five (Kamm 2016: 63). Contrast this with a paradigm case of a person being 
killed as part of the same event as saving five others:
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The Bystander Case: An out of control trolley is heading towards five people. 
A bystander can pull a switch to divert the trolley onto another track, but then 
one person on the other track will be killed.
The Principle of Permissible Harm permits the bystander to divert the trolley, as the 
one person’s death makes no causal contribution to saving the five. The one person’s 
death is a causal consequence of the event that saves the five, namely the redirecting 
of the trolley. In this respect, the one person’s death is better understood as part of 
the same event as saving the five, as opposed to a causal means to that event.
This paper is not a defence of Kamm’s Principle of Permissible Harm. The 
point here is that Kamm’s principle is the sort of consideration which could inform 
a value-sensitive design process. The discussion on the trolley problem provides 
considerable insight into the properties which make a difference to the moral per-
missibility of acts. Kamm’s principle does a better job than most of explaining our 
intuitions about what is permissible across a broad class of cases. So, used like this, 
trolley cases are relevant to the moral design problem.
The Wrong Question Argument
The final argument concedes that trolley cases are relevant to what morality requires 
in AV collisions. But it contends that the values which ought to be encoded into AV 
decision-making algorithms are not determined by moral considerations. Call this 
the Wrong Question Argument.
Himmelreich (2018: 675–676) argues that there is no unanimous agreement about 
which moral principles are true. So, any answer to the moral design problem based 
on trolley cases is unlikely to receive ‘broad societal acceptance’. This is because 
such an answer will appeal to principles which many people in society reject. Him-
melreich believes that broad societal acceptance is a necessary condition for a suc-
cessful solution to the moral design problem. So, what is required is not an answer 
to what morality requires in AV collisions, but instead an answer to a social choice 
problem. In Himmelreich’s words:
A trolley case prompts us to make an individual choice when what we in fact 
face is a social choice. What seems needed is a kind of compromise to over-
come disagreements over issues of value. (Himmelreich 2018: 676)
Himmelreich is correct that broad societal acceptance is a necessary condition 
for a successful answer to the moral design problem. But it is unclear why a solu-
tion based on moral principles would not receive broad societal acceptance. Presum-
ably, Himmelreich’s concern is legal moralism: the public would not accept a situ-
ation where AV manufacturers are legally required to encode certain moral values 
into AVs on the basis of moral arguments. But this is an exaggeration. Most people 
accept a modest form of legal moralism, according to which the moral wrongness of 
an action gives a pro tanto reason for criminalisation (cf. Duff 2014: 217). That is, a 
reason which ‘has genuine […] weight, but nonetheless may be outweighed by other 
considerations’ (Kagan 1989: 17; see also Broome 2013: 51–54). The strongest 
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arguments for criminalising theft, non-fatal offences against the person and murder 
are to some extent reliant on moral considerations. Yet these offences receive broad 
societal acceptance. So, it is not unreasonable to suppose that moral arguments 
might be used in answering the moral design problem.
Furthermore, Himmelreich’s commitment that an answer to the moral design 
problem should receive broad societal acceptance is insufficient to establish the 
stronger claim that the moral design problem is a social choice problem. Social 
choice theorists are interested in ‘[whether] it is formally possible to construct a pro-
cedure for passing from a set of known individual tastes to a pattern of social deci-
sion-making, the procedure in question being required to satisfy certain natural con-
ditions’ (Arrow 1963: 2). The standard way of making this question precise requires 
us to suppose that each individual in society has a preference ordering over a set 
of alternative policies. The challenge is then to describe a social welfare function, 
which takes the individual preference orderings as an input, and outputs a collective 
preference ordering over the policies. Social choice theorists dispute which formal 
properties the social welfare function should satisfy (Ibid.: 23; Sen 1970: 35–36). If 
the moral design problem is a social choice problem, then the values which ought to 
be encoded into AV algorithms depend on the preferences, tastes, or values of all the 
individuals in society. But the dependence relation is functional. What this means 
is that, taken together, the preferences, tastes, or values of each person in society 
uniquely determine the principles which ought to regulate AV behaviour.6
Himmelreich claims that broad societal acceptance is a necessary condition for a 
successful answer to the moral design problem. This might be true. But it does not 
follow that our problem is essentially one of aggregating individual tastes, prefer-
ences or values. This is true only if broad societal acceptance is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a successful answer to the problem. And there are rea-
sons to accept or reject solutions to the moral design problem which do not pertain 
to social choice. On one hand, if a collective judgement holds that AVs should act 
in accordance with immoral principles, then there is a moral reason to reject that 
solution to the moral design problem. On the other hand, if there is a moral differ-
ence between, for example, killing and letting die, then there is a pro tanto reason 
for this distinction to be reflected in AV decision-making algorithms. This reason 
has genuine weight irrespective of whether the killing and letting die distinction is 
reflected in the values of society taken as a whole. Himmelreich’s best response is to 
accept that the moral design problem is not essentially a social choice problem; and 
to instead claim that the problem has a social choice element. This is correct. It does 
6 It might be objected that I have interpreted Himmelreich’s use of the term social choice too narrowly. I 
have understood social choice in the way that Arrow (1963) and subsequent social choice theorists under-
stood the term. But there is a pre-Arrow sense of social choice which is not concerned with spaces of 
aggregation functions, but instead with particular aggregation functions. This was the approach of the 
Marquis de Condorcet. Even so, on this broader meaning of social choice, the preferences, tastes or val-
ues of all the individuals in society uniquely determine the collective judgement. The point here is that 
independent moral considerations may still be relevant to the values which there is best reason to encode 
into AV driving algorithms. So, my point stands. I am grateful to Richard Pettigrew and Johannes Him-
melreich for pressing me on this issue.
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matter that the values put into AV driving algorithms receive broad societal accept-
ance. But this weaker view does not support the argument against trolley cases, as 
whilst trolley cases are not relevant to social choice problems, these cases are rel-
evant to what is morally required in AV collisions.
Conclusion
The confusion about trolley cases and their role in AV ethics is explained by two 
factors. On one hand, some philosophers have used trolley cases as inputs to so-
called collision optimisation algorithms. These algorithms provide instructions 
for what AVs should do in the event of a trolley-style collision. This use of trolley 
cases invites the criticisms that trolley cases will not arise in practice; that there 
are substantial moral differences between trolley cases and the moral dilemmas in 
real-world collisions; and that answers to the moral design problem based on trolley 
cases make implausible assumptions about the AV’s knowledge and decision-mak-
ing algorithm. On the other hand, critics of trolley cases have downplayed the fact 
that trolley cases have a broader application than their current use in the literature 
on AV ethics. Philosophers such as Kamm (1996, 2007, 2016) and Thomson (1976, 
1990, 2008) have developed novel ethical principles which try to explain our moral 
intuitions across a broad class of idealised cases. Kamm’s Principle of Permissible 
Harm, for example, is precisely the sort of principle which deserves attention in the 
value-sensitive design process. Thus, there is a place for trolley cases in the ethics of 
AVs. But it is rather different from the place that philosophers have assigned it in the 
discussion so far.
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